



Critical Mission Support Through Energy Security

Development of an Army Energy Security Assessment Model

FUPWG


Mr. Chuck Tremel, *CTC*
21 October 2010

Purpose

- Provide an overview of the Army Energy Security Assessment (ESA) methodology
 - Being developed by Concurrent Technologies Corporation
 - Monitored by the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Engineering Research and Development-Construction Engineering Research Laboratory (ERDC-CERL)
- Engage Utility and Government Stakeholders

Overall Program Objectives

- Develop/enhance the draft ESA methodology demonstrated under the Army Power and Energy Initiative (APEI)
 - Leverage existing processes (e.g., Anti-terrorism/Force Protection)
 - Critical Mission focused
- Validate the methodology at an Army installation
- Demonstrate at four additional installations for implementation toward improving their energy security posture
- Refine for potential use across the Army
- DD-254 Secret Level Project Classification



Program Drivers

- DoD Goals include increasing Energy Security
 - EFACT05
 - Defense Science Board Recommendations
 - Executive Order 13514 (supersedes EO13423)
 - Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007
 - NDAA of 2009 and 2010
- 2010 DoD QDR defines Energy Security as:
 - “...having assured access to reliable supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet operational needs.”

Program Drivers

- Army-specific goals – Army Energy Security Implementation Strategy (AESIS)
 - ESG 4: Assured Access to Sufficient Energy Supply
 - Objective 4.1: Implement Energy Security Plans (ESPs)
 - Metric 4.1a: Provide an Army-level template for energy security plans
 - Metric 4.1b: Identify all Army critical facilities/installations
 - Metric 4.1c: % of installations with ESPs
 - Metric 4.1d: Review energy security and reliability considerations with utility suppliers and privatized utility service providers annually in accordance with the installation's ESP
 - Metric 4.1e: Implement recommendations to achieve reliable and adequate energy supply for critical facilities/installations

Program Benefits

- A standardized approach will provide a consistent methodology to assist installations in identifying mission-related:
 - Critical Facilities/Functions/(Sub)Components
 - Electrical requirements and infrastructure needs for those Critical Facilities
 - Potential energy security vulnerabilities
 - Prioritized energy security risks
- Provide actionable project solutions and business case justification for energy system enhancements
- Provide energy security documentation for future mission planning and energy system planning
- Ensure continuity of critical operations / enhanced mission capabilities

Overall Program Approach

- Establish an Army-level collaborative working group
- Working group expectations
 - Review current/enhanced ESA methodology
 - Provide candid feedback to improve the methodology
 - Identification of Critical Facilities
 - Vulnerability and Risk Management
- Continue to provide support to enhance and define the methodology


WG Members

- Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM)
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Energy and Partnerships (DASA-E&P)
- ERDC-CERL
- Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA)G-3/5/7
- HQDA G-3, Critical Infrastructure Risk Management (CIRM) Branch
- Installation Management Command (IMCOM)
- Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)
- US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP)


Current Assessments

- Many different critical asset lists are maintained
 - Mission Essential Vulnerable Areas (MEVA)
 - High Risk Target (HRT)
 - Directorate of Public Works (DPW) Critical Facilities List
 - Task Critical Assets (TCAs)
 - Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) reports/data
 - Risk Management Decision Package (RMDP) reports/data
- Currently, these lists are not integrated nor are energy issues specifically evaluated
- Objective of our ESA methodology is to do so

ESA Methodology



Step 1 - Prioritized Critical Energy Needs




Key Installation Personnel

- Garrison Commander (or delegate)
- Department of Public Works (DPW)/ Installation Services
- Directorate of Plans, Training and Mobilization – G3 (DPTM)
- Mission Owners/Major Unit Leads
- Directorate of Logistics (DOL)
- Directorate of Emergency Services (DES)
- Network Enterprise Center (NEC)
- Service Contracts and Inspections Office/Branch

Note: Some Army Installations may have a different organizational structure, but will still have personnel working within the scope of the descriptions provided.

Mission Decomposition



- Mission Decomposition will lead to a list of Critical Mission Tasks to prioritize
 - Mission Type
 - Mission Description
 - Mission Task
 - Mission Task Description
 - Mission Task Duration
- Mission Owners = Tenants, Units and Garrison
- Will loss of this Mission Task cause failure or severe degradation to the Mission?

Critical Facility Prioritization



- Mission Task Analysis will lead to a list of critical facilities
- Ranking of facilities by:
 - DES
 - DPW
 - DOL
 - NEC
 - MEVA List
 - HRT List
 - TCA List
 - Mission Command Preference
 - Garrison Command Preference
- Interdependency Rating for Facilities to Critical Mission Tasks
- Will loss of the Critical Facility, cause failure or severe degradation to the Mission?

Critical Facility Functions



Critical Facility
Functions

- Identification of critical facility functions will determine the interdependency of Utility Systems (on-post and off-post)
- Basis of Analysis
 - Energy needs to support the Mission
 - Adverse impact to Mission
 - Alternative Functionality
 - Time to Restore
 - Time to Impact Mission
- Will loss of this facility function, cause failure or severe degradation to the Mission?

Analysis of Utility Systems

Utility Systems
& Critical
Components /
Subcomponents

- Identification of Critical (Sub)Components
 - On-Post
 - Off-Post
- Critical (Sub)Components can affect the functionality of:
 - Critical Facilities
 - Critical Facility Functions
 - Utility Systems
- Critical (Sub)Components can be identified as single points of failure

Step 2 - Risk and Vulnerability Analysis

Risk/Vulnerability Analysis

- Threat Determination
 - Scenario Development
 - Wargaming
 - Probability of Occurrence
 - Readiness Impact
 - Impact to:
 - Energy (Sub)Components
 - Utility System
 - Facility Function
 - Facility
 - Mission
 - Risk Analysis
 - Calculated Risk Value
 - Risk Level Identification
 - Acceptable
 - Unacceptable
- Determine reality-based Initiating Events
 - Develop reality based threat scenarios
 - Analyze the prioritized Critical Facilities using a Wargaming process to determine
 - Probability of Occurrence
 - Readiness Impact/Severity
 - Calculated Risk Value
 - Risk Level/Acceptance versus Unacceptable
 - Simulation & statistical analysis techniques to account for uncertainties
 - Examine results to determine vulnerabilities


Step 3 – Installation Solutions

- Create a High Reliability Generation and Distribution System
 - Reduces Peak Demand
 - Increases Renewable Energy Application
 - Provides Quick Power Restoration
 - Provides Active Response to Weather, Aging, and Threats
- Eliminate Collocated Facilities
- Provide Redundancy
- Major Spare Parts Inventory
- Emergency Fuel Supply Plan

Islanding Plan

- High Reliability Generation and Distribution System
 - Intelligent Distribution System (Smart Grid)
 - Self Sustaining Electric Infrastructure
 - Onsite Electric Generation
 - Demand Response Control

Islanding Plan Methodology



Islanding Plan Methodology

- Define the Island
 - Identify operational needs based upon the Mission and Catastrophe
 - Create various operation scenarios from different situations
 - Prepare a hierarchy of loads
- Implement distribution system improvements to allow automated control and operation of the electrical system
 - Automated switching
 - Individual load control
- Review the Energy Profile of the Island
 - Electrical requirements
 - Distribution capabilities

Islanding Plan Methodology

- Identify the other Utility requirements to support long term operation
 - Water, Wastewater
 - Communication
- Interconnect to new and existing generation sources
 - Existing grid connected generation supply
 - New Generation assets, Renewable generation, Bio fuel generation
- Control the island
 - Monitor the generation assets
 - Control the distribution based upon the load needed
 - Isolate non essential loads when generation is over tasked
 - Control power flow to maintain the operation and mission

Path Forward

- Conduct Validation Assessment at Fort Detrick (Sept – Dec 2010)
- Schedule Pre-Coordination Meetings for final go-ahead
 - Joint Base Lewis McChord
- Continue discussions with:
 - Fort Bliss
 - Fort Bragg
 - Fort Stewart
- Meet with the ESA WG to discuss methodology and the results from the first site assessment (Dec 2010)
- Continue collaborations with PNNL to deliver the draft methodology to ACSIM
- Finalize data collection tool to support the methodology

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
Thank You!!

Back Up Slides

Program Drivers

- Observations from the field
 - Many Army Installations have energy systems (to include backup generation) that require modernization
 - It is a challenge for Army Installations to identify and prioritize Energy Security Improvements
 - Typically no regular interface with DES, DPTMS and others who regularly analyze vulnerabilities
 - Many installation energy security assessments/plans are out of date
 - AT/FP assessments are focused on a specific location's ability to deter and/or respond to a terrorist event - energy disruptions and effect on mission execution are a secondary outcome
 - Other mandates and requirements result in an inability to focus on priority tasks

Leveraging the DCIP/CIRM Approach



Notional Example – Fort Marshall

- Mission Decomposition
 - Sample Mission Description: ***Strategically deploy, conduct forcible assault, and secure key objectives for follow-on military operations in support of U.S. national interests***
 - Sample Mission Task: ***Conduct Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance from a central location***
 - Sample Task Description: ***Utilize Command Control HQ and worldwide communications to execute mission***
 - Sample Task Duration: ***One month***
 - Mission Owner(s): ***Unit Commander***



Notional Example – Fort Marshall



- Critical Facility: ***Command HQ Building, etc.***

- Critical Facility Function(s): ***HVAC, Data, Communications, etc.***

- Energy needs to support the Mission - ***Electricity, etc.***
- Adverse impact to Mission - ***Yes***



- Identification of Critical (Sub)Components

- ***On-Site Distribution Line, Substation (Transformer)***
- ***Off-Site Transmission Line, Substation (Transformer)***




- Alternate Functionality - ***Backup Diesel Generator with adequate fuel storage***


Notional Example – Fort Marshall

- Potential single points of failure
 - Dual electric primary feed to facility co-located on single structure
- Potential solutions to reduce risk/vulnerabilities
 - Work with Utility provider to separate primary feeds (Utility investment)
 - Provide redundant backup generator
 - Secure logistics plan for backup generator refueling during emergency conditions



Integration with ACSIM ESP





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